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Abstract 
 
September 11, 2001 marks the date of the largest attack on American soil since the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II. This event not only changed the 
lives of individuals who suffered intense loss but changed the course of American history 
in several ways. This paper focuses specifically on the changes in the intelligence 
community since the attacks. The attacks that 9/11 presented flaws in the system created 
demonstrating weakness as a direct result of the immense destruction that occurred. 
 The thesis of this paper is to analyze, assess, and draw conclusions on the 
effectiveness of the creation of the Director of National Intelligence position in the 
Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act, 2004. To assess that effectiveness, an overview 
of the Intelligence Community will be examined along with the relationship that exists 
between the DNI and other agencies, decisions that were made by incumbents, and an 
analysis of the security environments for the United States. The analysis demonstrates 
that the DNI does not necessarily help solve any problems, but creates another layer of 
bureaucracy. 
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An Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in            
Uniting the Intelligence Community 
Prior to 1940, the U.S. had two military branches with which to engage in war but 
did not have any type of intelligence organization. The main reason being for the lack of 
intelligence existing prior to this time period, despite the fact that the U.S. was founded in 
1776 with the signing of the Declaration of Independence, is because the U.S. had too 
small an interest in international relations to need anything more than a minimum 
military organization. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was founded in 1908 by 
Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte. The FBI was to be an investigative force of the 
Department of Justice. Today, its main intelligence interest is in domestic rather than 
international.       
President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Coordinator of Information (COI) and 
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) on the brink of World War II, led by William 
Donovan.1 These organizations acted as counterpart to the British intelligence agency that 
has its root in history hundreds of years before any national intelligence community in the 
U.S. existed. During the war the OSS had little impact on contributing to the Allied 
forces in winning, although it acted as a foundation for foreign intelligence in regards to 
espionage and counterintelligence operations.2 The military and OSS had a difficult 
interaction because of lack of trust between the two government bodies. As a result the 
                                                          
 
 1. Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009), 
18-19. 
 
 2. Ibid.  
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Joint Chief of Staff decided that the best way to unify both of the intelligence areas to 
create a better way to share information. While the OSS was incorporated under this 
structure, tension still existed between the two because of similar functions. This trend 
exists to this day as evident in the somewhat strained relationship between the 
Department of Defense and CIA.3 
The National Security Act (NSA) of 1947, signed by President Truman after 
World War II ended, marks the beginning of the new era for intelligence in the U.S. and 
is responsible for creating the intelligence community.4 As a result, the intelligence 
community developed under a very similar structure for more than 50 years in the midst 
of some of the greatest threats to the U.S. including the Cold War, a series of surrogate 
wars, and battles fought in latter half of the 20th century against the Soviet Union.  
With WWII fresh in Truman’s mind, he signed the NSA of 1947, which created 
several new concepts, offices, institutions and ideas into law regarding how the U.S. 
would operate in future international dealings. Truman also reorganized several ideas of 
foreign policy and military structure, as many of these branches overlap in when dealing 
with international relations. Specifically in regard to intelligence, the act established the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was a base for non-military intelligence for the 
government.5 
                                                          
 
 3. Ibid.  
 
 4. Milestones: 1945-1952, “National Security Act of 1947,” U.S. Department of State: Office of 
the Historian, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NationalSecurityAct (accessed January 24, 
2013).  
 
 5. Ibid.  
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The NSA also gave a legal foundation for the intelligence community by creating 
the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) who oversaw the national 
intelligence for the U.S.6 Truman made several innovative decisions in the NSA of 1947 
in regards to the DCI. For example, the DCI did not have military power such as 
controlling or directing troops for intelligence affairs. Additionally the CIA only had 
foreign power rather than national. The FBI would be domestic in nature; this distinction 
still exists to this day.  The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) later became an agency 
that dealt specifically with intelligence and the military in a different way than CIA 
would.7 
In regard to the legislators and the DCI, there would be knowledge for those with 
the proper clearance and positions in Congress and the executive branch, while they 
would not explicitly mention what was done covertly. Mainly, these are the acts that are 
listed under espionage, covert action and analysis that could be detrimental to national 
security if revealed.8 Truman was essential in the process of creating the intelligence 
community, knowing that there was a significant and prominent need for the type of work 
in the U.S. while it was not explicitly enumerated in the constitution as a branch of 
government per say.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 6. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 20.  
 
 7. “National Security Act of 1947.”  
 
 8. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 20. 
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The NSA of 1947 also notably established military organizations such as the 
National Security Council which included the Secretary of Defense who oversaw the 
newly created Department of Defense. The Department of Defense came out of merging 
the War Department and Navy Department along with the Air Force, which was 
established around the same time. While the Army Corps was essential in WWII, a need 
began to be more evident as planes and then, cutting edge technology, began to emerge 
over the 20th century.9 
There have been several events that have shaped the intelligence community since 
its official creation in 1947, such as several wars, failures, covert actions and attacks. 
These include, but are not limited to, the following incidents: Korean War (1950), Coup 
in Iran (1953), the Guatemala Coup (1954), the Missile Gap (1959-1961), the Bay of Pigs 
fiasco in Cuba (1961), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the Vietnam War (1964-1975), 
the Antiballistic missiles treaty and SALT I Accord (1972), intelligence investigations 
and hearings after the Vietnam War, Iranian revolution (1979), the Iran-Contra crisis 
during Reagan’s administration, the fall of the Soviet Union (1989-1991), the Ames spy 
scandal revealed (1994) and Hannssen spy case (2001).10 While all of these have affected 
intelligence operations and national security, the attacks on 9/11 remain to this day the 
biggest game changer in terms of legislation to manage intelligence and prevent attacks.  
                                                          
 
 9. “National Security Act of 1947.” 
 
 10. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 20-25.  
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September 11, 2001, was the largest attack on American soil since the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II. In brief, on 9/11 nineteen al-Qaeda terrorists 
led by Osama Bin Laden hijacked four domestic American planes. Two planes were 
flown into the World Trade Center in New York City and both of the towers collapsed 
and burned to the ground. The third plane flew into the Pentagon, the home of the 
Department of Defense in Arlington, VA. The fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania when 
passengers took charge of the plane and brought it to the ground before it could fly into 
the Pentagon or White House. Collectively, almost 3,000 innocent American citizens lost 
their life on that tragic day.11 
Several complicated and obvious questions arose from the stunned American 
people. The U.S. was clearly unprepared and caught off guard for this attack, yet how 
could they have been? Was not intelligence so carefully crafted and manufactured to 
eliminate or catch the enemy prior to such events from occurring? Is this the first of 
several attacks? Are we at war? These questions along with several of others were on the 
forefront of everyone’s mind minutes, hours, days, months and years after the attack as 
the U.S. began to unpack a much bigger problem than they previously had on their hands. 
Brigadier General Russell Howard, USA (Ret) explained the threat that appeared on 9/11 
was unlike any other type of terrorism the American people had faced before, 
“terrorism’s previous incarnations, were not nearly as organized, deadly, or personal as 
the attacks inflicted on New York City and Washington, D.C., or on that remote 
                                                          
 
 11. Stephen Atkins, The 9/11 Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2008). 
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Pennsylvania field.”12 He describes these attacks as a “new terrorism” where the tactics 
are ancient in nature that reaches across any borders with an ideological motivation that is 
explicitly religious in Islamic extremism organized by Bin Laden under the terrorist 
organization, al Qaeda.13 Al Qaeda’s motivation was to kill several thousand people to 
achieve their goals. The actual hijackers on 9/11 for each flight are listed in the image 
below. The attacks from al-Qaeda were carefully planned and crafted. Each of these 
hijackers was trained on American soil and lived here, infiltrating society before actually 
attacking the U.S. in such a horrific way. There were several signs that pointed to fact 
that they were terrorists based upon intelligence gathering that was done after identifying 
their identities after the attack. In hindsight, the question arises, why didn’t intelligence 
pick-up on any of these men prior to the attacks?  
                                                          
 
 12. Russell Howard, Reid Sawyer, and Natasha Bajema, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: 
Understanding the New Security Environment (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009), XIII.  
 13. Ibid.  
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The hijackers responsible for the 9/11 tragedy14 
After the attacks on 9/11 it became apparent that while the attacks were grand in 
scheme it potentially could have been prevented if the different intelligence agencies had 
shared information. The intelligence failure was seen by because of a “failure to connect 
the dots.”15 An immediate reaction to this was the removal of legal barriers to create 
sharing information amongst intelligence organizations and law enforcement, which 
came to fruition in October 26, 2001 by the USA Patriot Act.16 
                                                          
 
 
 
 14. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission 
Report, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf (accessed January 25, 2013).  
 15. Ibid.  
 16. Ibid. 
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As the U.S. began the recovery process, beginning at the burning buildings, policy 
leaders created “National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States” in 
November 2002 also commonly referred to as the “9/11 Commission.” Located in section 
604 of Public Law 107-306 the purpose of the 9/11 Commission is to investigate each of 
the details involved from the actual day of 9/11, an analysis of the enemy, and what 
future problems exist and persist. 22 July 2004, the 9/11 Commission was officially 
released for the public, available free of charge. This nearly 500 page report detailed 
circumstances surrounding 9/11, the terrorist attacks, foundations for terrorism and 
counter-terrorism, emergency responders, and wartime.17 Additionally, several 
recommendations and mandates are included to change legislation to be guarded against 
the future attacks. The report was created as a bipartisan effort on a committee that 
consisted of 10 congressmen, 5 democrats and 5 republicans. In the preface of the report, 
signed by Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, the chair, and vice chair, respectively, it 
states:  
In pursuing our mandate, we have reviewed more than 2.5 million pages of 
documents and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in ten countries. This 
included nearly every senior official from the current and previous administrations 
who had responsibility for topics covered in our mandate. We have sought to be 
independent, impartial, thorough, and nonpartisan…our aim has not been to assign 
individual blame. Our aim has been to provide the fullest possible account of the 
events surrounding 9/11 and to identify the lessons learned.18 
 
 
                                                          
 
 17. Ibid. 
 
 18. Ibid.  
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During this time of research, al-Qaeda continued to act and the U.S. engaged in 
war. A failure that occurred during this time which, was not as big as 9/11, but still held 
as much weight, was the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate’s (NIE) report on Iraq’s 
weapons of mass destruction program.19 In 2002, Director of Central Intelligence George 
J. Tenet wrote a statement regarding the controversy about the seemingly inaccurate data 
reported in the NIE. The controversy, in brief, was that the NIE was the best intelligence 
report gathered at the time was consistent and accurate from the data and reports in 
existence for several years. He wrote in a press release, “We have no doubt, however, 
that the NIE was the most reasonable, well-grounded, and objective assessment of Iraq’s 
WMD programs that was possible at the time it was produced.”20 Tenet essentially argues 
that given the intelligence at the time, the conclusions were the most accurate and 
conclusive.21 However, the intelligence was inaccurate. Along with this and other 
intelligence concerning 9/11, are reasons advanced for why the intelligence community 
was presumably in desperate need for reform.  
Located in the 9/11 Commission is also a report specifically regarding 
recommendations on how to make the intelligence community stronger by changing the 
existing structure with a better and more effective organization under the chapter, “How 
                                                          
 
 19. Aki J. Peritz et al, “Intelligence Reform,” Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the 
Intelligence Community, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/19154/ 
intelligence_reform.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F1304%2Feric_rosenbach%3Fpage%3D2 (accessed 
January 25, 2013).  
  
 20. George Tenet, “Statement on the 2002 NIE on Iraq’s Continuing Programs for WMD,” Central 
Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-
archive-2003/pr08112003.htm (accessed January 25, 2013).  
 
 21. Ibid.  
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to Do it? A Different Way of Organizing the Government?” In a profound statement, the 
writers of this document recognize a structural problem accounting for many of the 
events of 9/11: “Good people can overcome bad structures. They should not have to. The 
United States have resources and the people. The government should combine them more 
effectively, achieving unity of effort.”22   
The Commission identified six problems and recommendations they believed 
would aid in solving the holes and inconsistencies in the intelligence structure. These 
include (1) unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist 
terrorist across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center; (2) 
unifying the intelligence community with a New Intelligence Director; (3) unifying the 
many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based 
information-sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries; (4) 
unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and 
accountability; and (5) strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders.23 Within these 
recommendations are several underlying ideas foundational concerning intelligence 
failures that existed prior to 9/11.While the past cannot be changed, the future can be 
written to make amends for mistakes, quite literally through laws and a change of 
structures, as well as learning and recognizing faults and getting to the core of the 
problems.  
                                                          
 
22. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 399-40.  
 
23. Ibid. 
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Of the aforementioned recommendations, the underlying suggestion is that 
unification amongst the intelligence community is necessary in order to proactively 
engage the future rather than react to the attacks defensively by being caught completely 
off guard. In addition to the overarching ideas presented specific observations were 
included in the 9/11 Commission. These include the idea that the CIA is centralized while 
the FBI engages more with the department of Justice; the Department of Defense (DOD) 
is very large and unified under different commands; the new Department of Homeland 
security has a combination of resources for transportation security; the State Department 
is the leader in the government in regards to international policy; and at the White House, 
the National Security Council (NSC) is combined by a “parallel advisory structure,” the 
Homeland Security Council.24 All of these recommendations lead up to the following 
ideas of why the 9/11 Commission makes a recommendation that the Director of Central 
Intelligence should share responsibilities with a newly created Director of National 
Intelligence.  
Between 2001 and 2004 when the 9/11 Commission was released, the intelligence 
community was in a desperate position. After failed intelligence in the NIE, a sense in 
Washington and nationwide was for some quick action to change the intelligence 
community. Since the problems, inconsistencies, and failures were identified, it was now 
time to do something about it which came to fruition in the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, enacted 17 December by the 108th Congress. 
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This Act used the recommendations put forth in the 9/11 Commission to change the 
structure of the intelligence community in the most drastic fashion since its initial 
creation in 1947.  
The statues in the 
reads, “(An Act) to reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government and for other purposes
The IRTPA contains more 
While each detail has significance, the purpose of this analysis will focus specifically on 
the law that was established in Title I, Reform of the Intelligence Community, Subtitle A, 
Establishment of Director of National Intelligence. 
                                                          
 
25. Intelligence Reform and Te
Congress, http://www .nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf
26. Ibid.  
 
 
IRTPA begin with the purpose of the law in its entirety which 
than 200 pages of law for reform the intelligence community. 
 
Table of contents from the IRTPA26 
rrorism Prevention Act of 2004, U.S. Public Law 108
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 The IRTPA of 2004 reflects the investigations of the 9/11 Commission and the 
law the two documents cannot be discussed apart from each other as the IRTPA is the 
direct by-product of the 9/11 Commission recommendations.27 Within this Act, there are 
nine subtitles. One of the major faults that had been recognized in the intelligence 
community was a lack of unity and sharing of intelligence between agencies. Several 
agencies collect, process, analyze and disseminate intelligence but rarely shared the 
intelligence with the other agencies who had been either working on the same type of 
intelligence or could be beneficial in putting together missing pieces of information that, 
in essence could have prevented tragedies such as 9/11. 
 The 9/11 Commission recognized an overwhelming predicament in regard to the 
lack of unity and information sharing that could possibly prevent attacks. As a result, the 
question of the DCI and its position could not be ignored because he was the principal 
advisor to the president on intelligence issues and the head of the intelligence community 
and director of CIA. The 9/11 Commission lists the various structures of the intelligence 
community including to whom the DCI was directly responsible for other than overseeing 
CIA in general.28 This includes the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 
for Community Management, the Community Management Staff, the Terrorism Threat 
Integration Center, the National Intelligence Council, and other community 
                                                          
 
 27. Ibid.  
 
 28. Thomas Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 
Commission (New York: Vintage Books, 2006).  
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offices.29Additionally, it lists the national intelligence agencies including the National 
Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance 
Office, and other reconnaissance programs. Lastly it includes the departmental 
intelligence agencies which include the Defense Intelligence Agency; Army, Navy, Air 
Force and Marines Intelligence; Bureau of Intelligence and Research; Office of Terrorism 
and Finance Intelligence; Office of Intelligence and the Counterterrorism and 
Counterintelligence Divisions of the FBI; Office of Intelligence of the Department of 
Energy; Directorate of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection and 
Directorate of Coast Guard Intelligence of the Department of Homeland Security.30 
 The list recognizes how overwhelming the structures and intricacies were prior to 
9/11. However, it is not a matter of quantity but quality of intelligence from each. Each 
organization plays a specific role in the intelligence community while some of the roles 
consequently overlap as well. But at the end of the day, 9/11 and the NIE 2002 report of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction still happened. This cannot be ignored. The 9/11 
Commission recognizes six problems that were apparent before 9/11 and now to be 
changed. These include structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work because 
each agency has its own collection discipline rather than focus on sharing; a lack of 
common standards and practices across the foreign-domestic divide; divided management 
of national intelligence capabilities between each of the agencies and Department of 
                                                          
 
 29. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 407-410.  
 
 30. Ibid.  
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Defense, which makes the DCI less influential; weak capacity to set priorities and more 
resources, too many jobs for the DCI including running the CIA, manage the loose 
confederation of agencies, and to be the chief analyst to the President as his principal 
intelligence adviser; and too complex infrastructure in the intelligence community and 
too secret in the internal community and external for intelligence and matters that the 
DCI oversees.31   
 The 9/11 Commission recognizes that the DCI was being held responsible for the 
“community performance” without any actual authority to carry out those duties such as 
the power of the budget for the intelligence community, the ability to make decisions 
regarding the hiring and firing of senior officials, and the capability to make and execute 
expectations and positions in regards to the structure of the intelligence community and 
individual personnel.32 As a result, the DCI was put in the extremely difficult position of 
attempting to play several roles that no one office should be responsible for given the 
inability to do anything about it. Each of those previously mentioned powers rests in 
Congress and other organizations. Therefore, the 9/11 Commission recommends a new 
position to be created that would replace the DCI’s responsibility as a separate entity. 
Today it is called the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) but in the suggestion it was 
called the National Intelligence Director. The two main responsibilities that the 9/11 
Commission recommends for this position is to (1) oversee national intelligence centers 
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on specific subjects of interest across the U.S. government and (2) to manage the national 
intelligence program and oversee the agen
the intricacies of this new organization, the chart be
were being proposed in the 9/11 Commission. 
National Intelligence was first discussed in 19
the DCI was in need of a deputy that had a different position in overseeing the other areas 
of intelligence, not solely CIA
changes to the intelligence community
                                                          
 
 33. “History,” Office of the Dir
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/history
 34. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy,
 
 
cies that contribute to it. In order to understand 
low explains the relationships that 
Historically, the idea of the Director of 
55 by Congress when they recognized that 
.
33
 However, consistently there had been no significant 
 until the trigger of 9/11  
U.S. Intelligence Community34 
ector of National Intelligence, 
 (accessed January 25, 2013).  
 32.  
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As displayed in this organizational chart, the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) has cabinet level access and is incorporated into the executive 
branch which signifies the importance of this role is to the U.S. intelligence. 
Additionally, the IRTPA makes a note between the roles of the DCI and DNI in 
controlling “national intelligence” which incorporates foreign, domestic, and homeland 
security in the domestic intelligence.35 The DNI is not directly connected to any 
organization like the DCI, but rather is independent. It began with a staff of 
approximately 1600 people in order to accomplish the given tasks. However it has grown 
in size significantly since its creation and moved buildings to accommodate the growth. 
In general, the intelligence community has grown from 75,000 personnel to 100,000 
personnel exclusive of any contractors that work for the government.36 This can both be 
seen as positive and negative depending upon the perspective.  
                                                          
 
 35. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 29. 
 
 36. “ODNI FAQ,” Office of National Intelligence, 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/faq?tmpl=component&format=pdf (accessed January 25, 2013). 
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The chart shows the ODNI’s relationship in the Intelligence Community and its structure.37 
The DNI is responsible for the Intelligence Community, acts as the head of the 
intelligence community as a whole, answers to the President on all matters, and is in 
charge of the National Intelligence Program (NIP). The NIP specifically runs the budget 
for America’s Intelligence Community and acts as the head for the National Security 
Council and Homeland Security Council for Intelligence Matters related to national 
security.38 It is also in charge of the National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of 
                                                          
 
 37. Intelligence.gov, “A Complex Organization United under a Single Goal: National Security,” 
http://www.intelligence.gov/about-the-intelligence-community/structure.html (accessed January 25, 2013).  
 
 38. “History,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence.  
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America (NIS), which enumerates different objectives; the 100 and 500 Day Plans for 
Integration and Collaboration, a document which serves as plan for how to act in the 
intelligence world for collection, analysis and other important fields; and Missions 
Managers, which act as intelligence experts for the hardest intelligence arenas and 
players in the U.S. including Iran, North Korea and other hard to reach areas.39  
 Located in the IRTPA there are specific enumerated jobs that the ODNI has to do 
by law which are listed below:  
• Ensure that timely and objective national intelligence is provided to the President, 
the heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch, the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders; and the Congress; 
• Establish objectives and priorities for collection, analysis, production, and 
dissemination of national intelligence; 
• Ensure maximum availability of and access to intelligence information within the 
Intelligence Community; 
• Develop and ensure the execution of an annual budget for the National 
Intelligence program (NIP) based on budget proposals provided by IC component 
organizations; 
• Oversee coordination of relationships with the intelligence or security services of 
foreign governments and international organizations; 
                                                          
 
 39. Aki J. Peritz, “Intelligence Reform.” 
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• Ensure the most accurate analysis of intelligence is derived from all sources to 
support national security needs; 
• Develop personnel policies and programs to enhance the capacity for joint 
operations and to facilitate staffing of community management functions; 
• Oversee the development and implementation of a program management plan for 
acquisition of major systems, doing so jointly with the Secretary of Defense for 
DoD programs, that includes cost, schedule, and performance goals and program 
milestone criteria.40  
For accountability’s sake, the ODNI is held to a high standard regarding how they 
are able to operate. Especially since they are responsible for such important items on 
collection and intelligence on terrorism, proliferation, chemical warfare, biological 
warfare, information and infrastructure attack, narcotic trafficking through the various 
means of Signals Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence, Measurement and Signature 
Intelligence, Human-source Intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence and Geospatial 
Intelligence.41 The different bodies that oversee the ODNI include the President’s 
Intelligence Advisory Board, President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB), Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), 
                                                          
 
 40. “ODNI FAQ,” Office of National Intelligence, 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/faq?tmpl=component&format=pdf (accessed January 25, 2013).  
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House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), and other Committees in 
Congress.42  
After the IRTPA was signed in December of 2004, in February of 2005 President 
Bush nominated the Ambassador John Negroponte of Iraq to be in the inaugural Director 
of National Intelligence position as well as Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, USAF as the 
first Principal Deputy. Hayden also had extensive background in intelligence as the 
director of the National Security Agency (NSA).43 They were both sworn in on April 22, 
2005 and began their position the next day figuring out what exactly the position entailed 
in its entirety since it was newly created. The aforementioned position descriptions are a 
result of the work of these men who were trying to figure out their next moves in office 
from the list of responsibilities discussed in the IRTPA.  
These men were leading the way in this new era of intelligence in many ways, 
learning lessons and experiencing failures while trying to understand what exactly their 
responsibilities entailed and the authority of each of their decisions. Negroponte said in 
an interview at the Defense Intelligence Agency about the intelligence process, “My own 
view of intelligence is that there is no silver bullet…intelligence is a resource. It is a tool 
in our toolkit and one that we neglect at our own peril.”44 Negroponte had discovered that 
intelligence has many facets and is a dynamic entity in both theory and practice.  
                                                          
 
 42. Ibid.  
 
 43. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 30.   
 
 44. Defense Intelligence Agency Public Affairs, “Past DNIs Share Their Thoughts and Wisdom 
with DIA,” Defense Intelligence News, http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/news/2012-05-09.html (accessed 
January 24, 2013).  
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Quickly succeeding Negroponte were John M. (Mike) McConnell, Vice Admiral, 
USN Ret. who served as the Director of National Security Agency prior to his civilian 
career as the DNI. McConnell served has the DNI from February 2007 to January 2009.45 
He was only under President Obama for a few days before he retired from the position. 
McConnell said that when he was undertaking the grandiose task of trying to combine the 
intelligence community what he saw that the biggest area he saw was necessary to have a 
unified front amongst the different intelligence organizations that make up the 
intelligence community. He said in the same interview at the DIA, “The thing I felt most 
strongly about was what I practiced when I was on the inside [of the IC] and what I 
learned in my business: the power of collaboration…once a community or an institution 
really starts to work in a collaborative way, it's really incredible what is achieve.”46 
McConnell also made a similar statement in 2008 which said:  
[W]e have focused [on] the DNI’s role as the integrator of the community. 
We seek to create efficiencies and improved effectiveness in shared services like 
security clearances, information-sharing, information technology, and 
communications, but still promote an environment where the elements of the 
community serve their departmental responsibilities. This integration model of 
governance across the departments is still being defined because, quite frankly, we 
are in new territory for U.S. intelligence, something that has never been tried 
before, balanced with the need to have strong departmental intelligence elements in 
each department. 47 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
45. Ibid.  
 
 46. Ibid.  
 
 47. Ibid. 
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He recognized that the as the DNI’s office is the figure head for the intelligence 
community, their task was big in nature but the main aspect of it was to have a fluid 
integration and unity that was previously lacking because of communication problems. 
With the DNI at the top of the position, they can strongly encourage this integration by 
being a point person in this process. Several events, wars, and natural disasters have 
taken place that demonstrate that it is not just one intelligence organization, but rather a 
combination of intelligence community efforts to successfully bring the best quality 
analysis, aid, and intelligence. The best example of this is 9/11. In an analysis conducted 
by Richard A. Best Jr., a National Defense Specialist, on the success of the DNI after its 
creation for five years, in which he states:  
To the extent that the government is able to address new threats or 
opportunities), it is expected to require a capability of utilizing disparate agency 
capabilities on short notice and for limited periods without permanently changing 
statutory provisions for “authority, direction, and control.” In many ways 
intelligence agencies are arguably among the most agile agencies in the federal 
government and should be more amenable to these conditions than is the case with 
other departments.48  
 
 Dennis C. Blair, Adm., USN Ret., served as the DNI from January 29, 2009 to 
May 28, 2010 prior to the incumbent James R. Clapper, Lt. Gen., USAF Ret. Blair had a 
positive reaction to how the ODNI was making progress in the intelligence community 
for the field and its operations. He claimed that the main areas of improvement from 
failures leading to 9/11 were information sharing, technical and cultural barriers in the 
intelligence community, lack of diversity of the existing intelligence community.  Blair 
                                                          
 
 48. Richard A. Best, “The National Intelligence Director and Intelligence Analysis,” CRS Report 
for Congress (December 3, 2004), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21948.pdf (accessed August 25, 2012).  
27 
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
 
said that there were legitimate examples of the success of the DNI position in various 
projects including identifying the existence of the Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at 
Qum amongst several other successful items in intelligence such as the ODNI Rapid 
Technology Transition Initiative.49 
 The ODNI also created a joint duty program which created sharing between 
different organizations including the Department of Homeland Security, A-Space and the 
Library of National Intelligence. This helped in encryption and emailing with information 
sharing, enhancing the unity and communication in the intelligence community. 
Additionally the ODNI contributes to the President’s Daily Brief which they’ve now 
ensured includes intelligence from all spectrums in the intelligence community with a 
high standards and analytics in addition to other initiatives such as the Intelligence 
Advanced Research Project Activity (IARPA).50  
 While these are positive assessments of the success of the DNI, there are also 
negative inputs into how well this position is actually accomplishing the task it was 
initially intended for. The first reaction to this position is the idea that there have been 
several DNI’s since the position was created nearly 7 years ago. The media argued in 
2010 upon the resignation of DNI Blair the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board was 
investigated to see the value in the DNI’s position and determine if it was doing what it 
was intended to accomplish. Some of these conclusions state that the actual description of 
                                                          
 
49. Ibid.  
 
50. Ibid.  
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what the DNI position in the IRTPA was neither conclusive nor understandable in its 
intentions. As a result they said that the DNI should downsize by using other intelligence 
agencies to do the same functions it was doing. They believed that they overlapped too 
much to be successful. Instead of being a filter to the top, it was continuously working on 
the same things instead of sharing the intelligence.51  
 Additionally criticism has come from a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
which found that the ODNI and Intelligence Community do not have an adequate 
computer databases by having different information on several areas. This caused a lot of 
problems in communication. As a result, while it is not officially operating, the 
intelligence community is in the process of creating a database in order to solve this 
problem.  
 In summary: the Intelligence reform was launched in 2001. The ODNI has created 
a timeline to highlight the key reforms.  
                                                          
 
 
 51. Ibid.  
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            Timeline of Key Reforms from ODNI52 
 This timeline demonstrates that the Intelligence Community has been moving 
forward in many directions in the past few years, trying to do something different than 
prior to 9/11. With that being said, there are several factors that play into the 
effectiveness of the ODNI and the DNI itself. The ODNI was originally designed to 
combat the intelligence failures of disunity and lack of communication that was credited 
to several intelligence failures. Additionally, the DNI was to serve as the head of the 
Intelligence Community, creating a better system of communication with the President. 
                                                          
 
 52. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, presentation from the Intelligence Community 
Virtual Career Fair, “Leading Intelligence Integration: An Overview of the ODNI,” February 27, 2013.  
30 
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
 
The ODNI has to a degree accomplished the given tasks in name, but not necessarily in 
functionality.  
Prior to 9/11 the DCI was accomplishing the tasks of the current DNI. However, 
the responsibility was given without the full budgetary control to successfully act in the 
way necessary to have sufficient integration and communication. In the desperation of the 
aftermath of 9/11, Congress had the pressure to act and needed to do something. This is 
evidence by the amount of legislations, investigation, and reforms. The 9/11 Commission 
was an accurate analysis and representation of the intelligence community situation 
surrounding 9/11. The lack of quality intelligence was shocking when looking back on 
the events and details.  
 Thus, quick reforms and creations resulted such as in the Patriot Act and creation 
of the Department of Homeland Security. Regarding the ODNI, was it first really 
necessary to create? The argument could go in either direction given the circumstances. 
Something needed to change and this was Congress idea in changing the intelligence 
community. In reality, instead of rushing and creating a new office with new 
responsibilities that overlap with the then DCI may have not the most beneficial move. 
Intelligence by nature is difficult to comprehend and there is disconnect between policy 
makers and the intelligence community. Since it is due to the very nature of each entity, 
this will constantly be a struggle to find the best solutions that will discovered through 
trial and error. However, this should not be an excuse for failures. With the amount of 
resources that exist, being a good steward and using the resources with thoughtfulness 
based upon reality can accomplish the given task. Prior to the creation of the ODNI, a 
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reform that would have been similarly effective without the amount of overlap and 
people who work in the ODNI currently adding to bigger government limiting 
effectiveness, could have been simply creating new deputy positions for the DCI. These 
deputies would have responsibility for the problems existing.  
 In hindsight, the ODNI has done what the DCI deputies could have done but 
through an extreme increase in personnel accompanied by confusion of what the position 
was created for in the first place. Additionally, the DNI does not have as much control of 
the purse strings in the budget that would be necessary to really make a change. In order 
to be maximally effective responsibility and resources would have to change.  
 Despite the negative representation of the effectiveness of the ODNI’s existence, 
the ODNI has accomplished several positive tasks in uniting the Intelligence Community. 
In a figurative sense, the structure makes more sense in who answers to whom for 
accountability in the government. Yet the problem still exists at how big the intelligence 
community has gotten with overlap and lack of sharing. The DNI acts more as a 
figurehead of unity, rather than an actuality of unity. This is a result of the fact that the 
ODNI has to continuously grow bigger with more personnel to accomplish the exact 
same tasks as the other intelligence communities. Bigger government and personnel do 
not qualify as quality and act as a safeguard against failure. Therefore, several of the 
same problems exist and persist before its creation.  
 In conclusion, the DNI has united the intelligence community to a degree. It has 
been effective in some ways by encouraging unity through a variety of internal programs 
and information sharing. Its beginnings have been shaky without lucid direction from its 
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inception on its responsibility, lack of resources and responsibility, and personnel growth 
that overlaps the intelligence community, and the amount of DNI’s to hold the position 
since it began. Time and quality reforms in action will tell if these problems can be 
figured out in the future to be optimally effective in the intelligence community.  
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